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This paper re-estimates the knowledge-capital model by James Markusen (2002) to study 
market access and factor endowment explanations of foreign direct investment (FDI). I add to 
the literature by combining consistent datasets on Japanese and U.S. multinational enterprises 
(MNE) in the period 1989-2002. To reduce potential bias, the prior specification of the 
knowledge-capital model is augmented with a number of additional control variables and 
estimated with a system GMM estimator. In the pooled sample, I find that both market access 
and relative skill endowments matter for the pattern of foreign affiliate sales. When separately 
estimating Japanese and US samples, the evidence shows that Japanese MNEs are encouraged 
by relative unskilled-labor abundance in a host country, consistent with a vertical motive of FDI. 
In contrast, U.S. MNEs concentrate on skill abundant countries, which is in favor of horizontal 
FDI. These findings imply that combining datasets on multinational activities with 
heterogeneous motives of FDI is critical for finding evidence of the knowledge-capital model. 
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1. Introduction   
The rise of foreign direct investment (FDI) has been a prominent aspect of the 
globalization over the recent decades. The average growth rate of world FDI flows exceeded over 
20 % per year in the period 1986-2000 and outpaced the growth rates of world income and 
international trade. The global production by multinational enterprises (MNE) accounted for 10 % 
of world output in 2005, as measured by the value added of all foreign affiliates as a share of 
world GDP (UNCTAD, 2006). 
The theory of multinational firms focuses primarily on market access and factor-cost 
motives of FDI. Some MNEs are horizontally integrated by replicating the same production 
process in multiple countries to economize on transportation and trading costs of international 
trade (Markusen, 1984; Brainard, 1993; Markusen and Venables, 1998, 2000). Other MNEs are 
vertically integrated by geographically fragmenting stages of production to take advantage of 
international factor-price differences (Helpman, 1984; Helpman and Krugman, 1985). More 
recently, the knowledge-capital model (KC model) developed by Markusen (1997, 2002) 
encompasses both horizontal and vertical motives of FDI in a two-country general equilibrium. 
The model allows for the simultaneous existence of vertical and horizontal MNEs by assuming 
both trade costs and different factor intensities across production stages. 
While the KC model integrates two separate motives of FDI in a coherent framework, a 
recent body of empirical work provides mixed evidence for the vertical part of the KC model. 
Consistent with a factor-cost motive, some studies find that MNE activity is positively influenced 
by international differences in relative skill endowments and larger in relatively 
unskilled-labor-rich countries (Carr, Markusen, and Maskus, 2001, hereafter CMM; Braconier, 
Norbäck, and Urban, 2005, hereafter BNU). Yet, others find that MNE operations are greater in 
more skill abundant countries (Brainard, 1997; Markusen and Maskus, 2001, 2002; Blonigen, 
Davies, and Head, 2003, hereafter BDH;). These mixed results raise the questions of whether 
MNEs pursue horizontal and/or vertical strategies in overseas production. What country   2
characteristics determine the pattern of affiliate activity? Does the KC model explain the rapid 
expansion of multinationals? 
This paper reconsiders market access and factor endowment explanations of FDI by 
exploring three potential sources in the literature that may lead to the mixed support for the KC 
model: MNE data, policy influences, and endogeneity problems. First, most studies are based on 
US data of inward and outward affiliate sales (CMM, 2001; Markusen and Maskus, 2001, 2002; 
BDH, 2003). This may lead to skewed results because the US is by far larger than any other 
economy and among the most skill abundant countries. On the other hand, affiliate data collected 
from various national sources may have substantial variations in the survey qualities by source 
and year (BNU, 2005).
1 To construct a consistent dataset with a variety of country pairs, I 
combine new panel data on sales by foreign affiliates of Japanese MNEs with existing US MNE 
data over the period 1989-2002. Systematic differences across the data sources are controlled by 
parent-country fixed effects. I also construct another measure of MNE activity by excluding 
affiliate exports to the third country from total sales to mitigate a nuisance third-country effect in 
estimation.   
Second, multinational activity has been influenced by recent policy changes characterized 
by a shift from protectionism toward FDI to liberalization and promotion of MNE, but previous 
studies focus on a limited number of explanatory variables.
2 An empirical specification is 
augmented with a number of extra conditioning variables that may affect multinationals: a 
common language, a land border, landlocked countries, island nations, regional trade agreements, 
bilateral investment treaties, bilateral tax treaties, tax sparing agreements, euro currency, and 
financial crises. Third, I employ the system generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) estimator 
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to address previously unexplored endogeneity issues. 
                                                 
1  See Lipsey (2003) for a survey on the concept, measurement, and data of FDI. 
2  The number of international investment agreements such as bilateral investment and double 
taxation treaties reached almost 5500 at the end of 2005, which consisted of 2495 bilateral investment 
treaties, 2758 double taxation treaties, and 232 other agreements that contain investment provisions 
(UNCTAD, 2006).   3
The GMM estimation also extends previous findings on the KC model by investigating whether 
an exogenous component of key variables affects multinational activity. 
Robust to a wide variety of alternative specifications, I find little evidence that affiliate 
sales are higher in relatively unskilled-labor-rich countries in a pooled Japanese and US sample. 
The vertical part of the KC model is not supported by the pooled data. However, I find in separate 
Japanese and US samples that Japanese affiliate sales are larger in relatively 
unskilled-labor-abundant countries but US affiliate sales are smaller in such countries. This 
finding helps in explaining weak support for vertical MNE in previous literature that uses almost 
exclusively the US data.   
I confirm that market access plays a key role in determining a pattern of affiliate sales. 
The benchmark results suggest that (1) a 1 billion dollar increase in total GDP levels of home and 
host countries expands affiliate sales by 20 million dollars, (2) a 1 billion dollar increase in GDP 
differences between these countries reduces affiliate sales by 11 million dollars, and (3) a 
one-percentage-point increase in trade barriers as measured by a survey index of protectionism 
raises affiliate sales by 90 million dollars. These findings lend considerable support for the 
horizontal part of the KC model. 
Section 2 overviews the theory and evidence on the KC model. Section 3 discusses three 
main improvements in empirical strategies: a largely augmented specification, new panel data on 
Japanese MNE with data sources on independent variables, and a brief description of a system 
GMM estimator. Section 4 contains the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theory and Evidence on the Knowledge Capital Model 
The KC model developed by Markusen (1997, 2002) is a two-country general 
equilibrium model that allows for both horizontal and vertical MNEs. The model assumes two 
homogeneous goods (X and Y), two countries (home and foreign), and two homogeneous input 
factors, unskilled and skilled labor. Good Y is unskilled-labor-intensive and produced under   4
constant returns to scale in a competitive industry. Good X is skilled-labor-intensive and 
produced under increasing returns to scale, and producers are subject to Cournot competition with 
free entry and exit. Firms in this sector have headquarters services (blueprints, management, 
R&D, etc.) and production facilities. Trade costs exist for international trade and markets are 
segmented. In this structure, three types of firms may emerge; (1) horizontal MNE headquartered 
in the home country maintain production facilities in both countries, (2) vertical MNE 
headquartered in the parent nation have a single plant in the foreign country, which may export to 
home, and (3) national firms have headquarters services and a single plant in the home country, 
which may export to the foreign country. 
  Knowledge capital plays a key role in the existence of multinational firms. First, a 
parent firm can simultaneously supply headquarters services to both domestic and foreign plants 
at low cost due to a joint-input property of knowledge capital. The additional cost of building a 
second plant is small relative to the cost of establishing a new firm with a headquarters and plant 
abroad. Multi-plant economies of scale generate a cost advantage for horizontal MNE. Second, 
headquarters services are more skilled-labor intensive than production activities and can be 
geographically fragmented from production facilities. Different factor intensities and separability 
of knowledge capital generate a cost advantage for vertical MNE. 
Based on numerical simulations, the KC model generates key predictions on the 
aggregate pattern of MNE activity as a function of characteristics of both parent and host 
countries. First, the theory predicts that affiliate production should be larger in the presence of 
greater factor-price differentials across countries, which are partly driven by differences in 
relative skill endowments. More specifically, when a host country is skill abundant relative to a 
parent nation, there is little incentive for firms to establish foreign plants because unskilled 
workers for production are too costly abroad. As the host country becomes moderately 
unskilled-labor abundant, a decline in the relative cost of skilled workers at home and unskilled 
workers in the foreign country encourages headquarters activity and foreign production of   5
horizontal MNE. A further decline in host-country skill abundance creates larger unequal factor 
prices across countries, which in turn promote vertical MNE to exploit much cheaper unskilled 
labor abroad. Thus, MNE activity should be larger in less skill abundant countries relative to 
parent nations and vice versa. 
Second, a factor-price motive combines with the market size effects to further expand 
affiliate production because multinationals have an incentive to concentrate production in a large 
market for plant-level economies of scale. Particularly, larger market size allows vertical firms to 
sell the greater proportion of final output in a local market and reduce trade costs to import 
products back to home. MNE activity should be more pronounced in skilled-labor-scarce 
countries that have larger markets relative to parent nations. 
Third, the total market size of home and host countries positively affects affiliate activity. 
When the total market size is larger, national firms with high marginal costs in serving foreign 
markets are replaced by horizontal MNEs with high fixed costs. Fourth, differences in the market 
size discourage production by multinationals. When market sizes are largely different, horizontal 
MNEs with high fixed costs are replaced by national firms that prefer the large country as a site 
of production to avoid costly production capacity in the small market. 
Previous work focuses primarily on these implications of the KC model and evaluates the 
relative importance of a factor-cost motive by exploring the effects of relative skill endowments 
on MNE activity. The study by CMM (2001) estimates a specification that includes skill 
differences defined as the ratio of skilled labor to total labor force in a home country minus that in 
a host country and an interaction term between skill differences and market-size differences. 
Using panel data on US inbound and outbound affiliate sales in 1986-1994, they find that affiliate 
sales are positively correlated with the skill differences and its positive impact is more 
pronounced in relatively large host markets. An additional support for the vertical motive is 
provided by BNU (2005), who specify skill differences as the relative unskilled-labor abundance 
in a host country compared to a home nation and use data on affiliate sales with expanded country   6
coverage. However, data on affiliate sales developed from a diverse set of national sources may 
not be internationally comparable. 
  In contrast, when skill differences in the CMM’s specification are defined as the 
absolute value to avoid a sign reversal in the difference term, larger skill differences reduce 
affiliate sales in the CMM’s data (BDH, 2003).
3 The evidence in favor of the horizontal, rather 
than vertical, part of the KC model is further added by Markusen and Maskus (2001), who find 
that the levels of US outward affiliate sales disaggregated by destination markets are greater in 
more skill abundant countries. Markusen and Maskus (2002) show that the horizontal and KC 
model performs well in explaining a pattern of aggregate MNE activity, but the vertical model is 
a poor characterization of such activity. 
However, these studies are almost exclusively based on US data of multinational 
activity in which the US involves either a parent country or a host country in every observation. 
In addition, most work does not fully address a variety of other important determinants of FDI 
and pay little attention to endogeneity of key regressors. These weaknesses may lead to biased 
estimates for key regressors. In sum, all of these concerns leave open the question of whether 
relative skill endowments affect multinational activity. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
3.1. Specification 
  Previous studies on the KC model have focused on a relatively small number of 
explanatory variables and omitted other important determinants of FDI. In order to reduce 
omitted variables bias, I largely augment a specification for a parent and host country i and j at 
time t: 
                                                 
3  Carr et al. (2003) criticize the absolute value specification suggested by BDH because it 
imposes symmetry restrictions on affiliate sales between countries. They suggest that separating 
samples either for inbound and outbound US affiliate sales or for positive and negative skill 
differences is a more reasonable way to overcome the sign reversal issue.   7
RSALEijt = β0 +β1SKILLijt + β2SKLGDPDFijt + β3GDPSUMijt + β4GDPDIFSQijt  
+ β5TCjt + β6ICjt + β7DISTij + β8CMLij + β9BORDij + β10LANDLj  
+ β11ISLANDj +β12RTAjt +β13BITijt +β14BTTijt +β15TSPijt                 ( 1 )  
+β16EUROjt +β17CRISjt +β18JPMNE + ΣtγtTt + ηij+ εijt 
 
  RSALE is the real volume of sales by affiliates of i in j at time t. 
  SKILL is the relative skilled-labor abundance in i compared to j at t. 
  SKLGDPDF is an interaction term between SKILL and the difference in real GDP levels 
between i and j at t. 
  GDPSUM is the sum of real GDP levels of i and j at t.   
  GDPDIFSQ is the square of differences in real GDP levels in i minus that in j at t.   
  TC is trade costs for foreign products imported to j at t.   
  IC is investment costs for multinational operations in j at t. 
  DIST is the distance in kilometers between the capital cities in i and j.   
  CML is a binary variable equal to one if i and j have a common language.   
  BORD is a binary variable equal to one if i and j share a national border. 
  ISLAND is a binary variable equal to one if j is an island nation. 
  LANDL is a binary variable equal to one if j is a landlocked nation.   
  RTA is a binary variable equal to one after j joins a regional trade agreement at t.   
  BIT is a binary variable equal to one after a bilateral investment treaty between i and j enters 
into force at t.   
  BTT is a binary variable equal to one after a bilateral tax treaty between i and j becomes 
effective at t.  
  TSP is a binary variable equal to one after a tax sparing agreement between i and j enters into 
force at t.   
  EURO is a binary variable equal to one after j introduces the euro at t.   
  CRIS is a binary variable equal to one if j has a financial crisis in t-1. 
  JPMNE is a binary variable equal to one if i is Japan.   
  Tt is a set of time fixed effects, with γt a vector of the coefficients. 
  ηij is a country-pair fixed effect. 
  εijt is an error term, which is assumed to be N(0, σ
2). 
 
This paper addresses the main hypothesis that MNE activity motivated partly by factor 
price differentials should be larger in more unskilled-labor-rich host countries relative to home 
nations. This key prediction is captured by the SKILL variable. Following BNU (2005), the 
variable is defined as follows: 
Home USK
Host USK Home USK






                  ( 2 )    8
where SK Home and SK Host are skilled labor in home and host countries, and USK Home and 
USK Host are unskilled labor in home and host nations.
4 A  rise in  SKILL implies an increase in 
skilled-labor abundance of the home country relative to the host country or a rise in 
unskilled-labor abundance of the host country relative to the parent country. An expected sign of 
SKILL is positive. 
An interaction term between SKILL and GDP differences captures the theoretical 
prediction that a positive influence of skill endowments on MNE activity should be more 
pronounced in larger countries. Since a rise in the relative size of host markets corresponds to a 
decline in GDP differences between home and host countries, an expected sign of SKLGDPDF is 
negative. These first two terms are key regressors to identify a vertical motive of Japanese and US 
MNEs. 
Horizontal motives of MNE activity are captured primarily by GDPSUM, GDPDIFSQ, 
and  TC. As explained in the previous section, the KC model predicts that GDPSUM and 
GDPDIFSQ should have positive and negative coefficients, respectively. Higher inward trade 
costs in the host country promote horizontal MNE that invest abroad for the savings of trade costs. 
An expected sign of TC is positive. Investment barriers deter MNE entry into host markets, and 
IC should have a negative coefficient. Distance between countries is a proxy not only for 
transport costs between countries but for information and monitoring costs on business operations 
in the foreign country. An expected sign of DIST is unclear. 
As is common in the gravity model of international trade (Rose, 2004), I include 
time-constant country characteristics such as a common language (CML), a land border (BORD), 
                                                 
4  It is controversial whether the effects of skill endowments should be captured by 
differences in relative skill endowments across countries or by the absolute value of skill differences 
(Carr et al., 2003; BDH, 2003). SKILL is used to avoid the problem that a rise in skill differences 
implies a divergence in relative skill endowments when a parent nation is more skill abundant but a 
convergence when a parent country is less  skill  abundant.       9
and island (ISLAND) and landlocked status (LANDL).
5 Since CML reduces business transaction 
costs in foreign countries for multinationals, it should have a positive coefficient. BORD 
facilitates production networks by linking parent and affiliate firms through land transportations, 
and an expected sign of BORD is positive. On the other hand, island nations lack the means of 
land transportation to nearby markets and incur higher transportation costs to regional markets. A 
predicted sign of ISLAND is negative. Lastly, landlocked nations are disadvantageous to marine 
transportation for a lack of ocean ports. An expected impact of LANDL is negative. 
A rich body of empirical work investigates the effects of international investment 
agreements on multinationals. My study is distinctive in that MNE activity are measured more 
directly by affiliate sales than FDI flows and stocks used in most studies. Regional trade 
agreements (RTA) consist of trade liberalization within the region and investment liberalization 
toward foreign investors (Blomstrӧm and Kokko, 1997). Falling internal trade costs and the larger 
size of regional markets may expand affiliate exports to integrated countries. The investment 
liberalization contains the elimination of discriminatory policies against foreign firms as well as 
dispute resolution mechanisms, which may reduce investment barriers to FDI. An expected sign 
of RTA is positive.   
The common objective of bilateral investment treaties (BIT) is to protect the property 
rights of foreign investors by improving the standard of legal protection, assuring compensation 
for the expropriation by host governments, and establishing dispute settlement mechanisms 
(Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004; Hallward-Driemeier, 2003). BIT should have a positive effect on 
affiliate sales.
6 On the other hand, bilateral tax treaties (BTT) have ambiguous influences on 
MNE activity (Blonigen and Davies, 2004). BTT play a role in reducing double taxation on profits 
arising from business operations in a foreign country and eliminating tax avoidance of 
                                                 
5  For US MNE, a common language includes English-speaking countries and a land border 
contains Canada and Mexico. 
6  Japan and the US have signed BIT with 10 and 45 host countries by the year 2002, 
respectively. The vast majority of these signatories represent the developing countries.   10
multinationals that are able to shift taxable profits from high to low tax countries. While a 
reduction of tax distortions may promote MNE activity in host signatories, tax treaties also 
weakens an incentive of MNE to invest abroad for tax minimization reasons. 
Tax sparing agreements (TSP) are designed to resolve tax issues faced primarily by the 
developing countries that attempt to attract foreign investment through fiscal incentives such as 
tax exemptions (Hines, 2001; Azémar et al., 2006). A major issue is that the fiscal incentives do 
not necessarily reduce a tax burden of multinationals who claim a foreign tax credit in their home 
country. For instance, Japan has the worldwide tax system that provides a foreign tax credit to 
Japanese firms for the taxes already paid in foreign countries in order to avoid double taxation.
7 
Under a tax credit rule, the tax savings from fiscal benefits by host governments merely decrease 
the amount of the foreign tax credit that multinational firms can claim, making their after-tax 
profits unchanged. To avoid this, TSP allow firms to claim a foreign tax credit for additional 
income that have been spared by fiscal grants in foreign countries. A predicted sign of TSP is 
positive. 
Monetary economic events affect MNE activity. The common currency such as the euro 
(EURO) decreases transaction costs within the member countries and stimulates trade flows in the 
region (Rose, 2004). While falling internal trade costs expand affiliate exports to regional markets, 
they may stimulate multinationals to concentrate their production in lower cost countries within 
the monetary union.
8 An expected sign of EURO is ambiguous. On the other hand, the financial 
crises (CRIS) affect MNE operations through two channels as argued by Lipsey (2001); the 
stagnation in a host market might decrease local sales of foreign affiliates and the devaluation of a 
local currency could raise their export sales. The expected sign of CRIS is unclear. The predicted 
signs for the independent variables are summarized as follows: 
                                                 
7  Japan signed the first tax sparing agreement with Pakistan in 1959 and maintained tax 
sparing provisions in force with 13 countries at the end of 2000, with most of these countries 
concentrated in Asia. In contrast, the US does not grant tax sparing provisions. 
8  Aristotelous (2005) examines the effects of euro currency on US FDI flows into the 
European Monetary Union members.   11
[Table 1 around here] 
 
3.2. Data 
  Empirical work on multinationals has always faced a trade-off between data consistency 
and country coverage. The more data are collected from a variety of national sources, the less 
consistent the data are due to deviations in measurement of foreign affiliate activity and the 
varying qualities across and within sources. For example, a survey on overseas business activities 
of Japanese parent firms is annually collected by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
(METI). Since responding to the METI survey is not mandatory for parent firms, the official data 
on Japanese MNE are known to suffer from low response rates of around 60 %, varying samples 
of parent firms over time, and widely fluctuating sales at the affiliate level (Lipsey, 2003).   
To improve the Japanese survey data, Matsuura (2004) constructs panel data at the 
affiliate level and estimates missing sales for certain affiliates in the years 1989-2002.
9 Affiliate 
sales in the improved data are aggregated over manufacturing sectors to the country level. To 
expand country coverage, I also exploit data on foreign affiliates of US parent firms in nonbank 
manufacturing from the U.S. Bureau of Economics Analysis (BEA). Affiliate sales of Japanese 
and US MNEs are measured in millions of year 2000 US dollars using the average of Yen-dollar 
annual exchange rates in the 1989-2002 period and a US wholesale price index from the 
International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund.     
To check for consistency between the RIETI and BEA datasets, aggregate sales by 
Japanese manufacturing affiliates in the US from the RIETI source are compared with those from 
the Foreign Direct Investment in the United States published by the BEA. I find that Japanese 
affiliate sales from the RIETI are overestimated by 71.9 % on average for 1989-2002, compared 
                                                 
9  The RIETI data are available at http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/database/d08.html. See Matsuura 
(2004) for details.     12
to the BEA source.
10  Since such a discrepancy between Japanese and US affiliate sales would be 
higher (lower) in the larger (smaller) country. I control for the systematic differences in the data 
by a dummy variable for Japanese MNE. 
  I construct an alternative measure of MNE activity that excludes affiliate exports to a 
third country from total sales because the KC model is formulated in a two-country setting. The 
RIETI reports local sales and exports to a home country as a share of Japanese affiliate total sales. 
The sum of these sales is aggregated across manufacturing industries to the country level. I 
exploit the BEA data on local sales and export to home by the US majority-owned foreign 
affiliates (MOFA).
11 The sum of sales to local and home markets is measured in millions of US 
dollar analogously as affiliate total sales. Summary statistics and a list of countries included in 
regressions are shown in the appendix. 
Standard data sources are used for the independent variables. Data on skill endowments 
are taken from the Yearbook of Labor Statistics published by the International Labor Organization 
(ILO). Skilled labor in each country is defined as the sum of workers classified as occupational 
categories 0/1 (professional, technical, and related workers) and categories 2 (administrative 
workers). Unskilled labor is defined as the total labor minus the skilled labor.
12  Data on real GDP 
measured in billions of year 2000 US dollars are taken from the World Development Indicators.
13  
Trade costs are measured by an index of national protectionism on imports from the 
World Competitiveness Report jointly published by the International Institute of Management 
Development (IMD) and the World Economic Forum for 1989-1995 and the World 
Competitiveness Yearbook by the IMD for 1996-2002. The index is developed from an extensive 
business survey that measures the perceptions of multinational managers on the business 
                                                 
10  The deviations across the data sources may be due to survey methods, the survey quality, 
and the definition of foreign subsidiaries. 
11  MOFA are the foreign business enterprise in which the combined ownership of all US 
parents exceeds 50 %.   
12  Data appendix for details in constructing the skill variable is available upon request. 
13  Taiwan GDP data are taken from the Department of Commerce, Taiwan.   13
environment across countries. Trade cost is defined to range from zero to 100, with a higher 
number indicating greater trade barriers. Investment cost is a simple average of several survey 
indices from the same source. Investment cost is defined to range from zero to 100, with a higher 
value indicating larger investment barriers. Investment impediments include foreign investment 
restrictions, limitations on negotiating joint ventures, restrictions on hiring and firing practices, a 
lack of the fair administration of justice, limited accessibility of local and foreign capital markets, 
inadequate protection of intellectual property rights. 
Data on distance measured in kilometers between capital cities of home and host 
countries are from the International Trade Data website of Raymond Robertson (formerly 
maintained by Jon Haveman). Data on a common language are from the same website. I use the 
CIA’s World Factbook for a land border, island and landlocked nations. I exploit data from the 
World Trade Organization to construct an indicator for 4 regional trade agreements: EU, NAFTA, 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and Mercosur.
14 Information on bilateral investment treaties 
is taken from the Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999 published by the United Nations.
15 
Whether BIT enters into force after signature is checked by the official websites of Japan and the 
US.  
Data on bilateral tax treaties for Japan and the US are taken from the International Bureau 
of Fiscal Documentation and Blonigen and Davies (2004), respectively. Data from Azémar et al. 
(2006) and OECD (1998) are used to create an indicator of tax sparing agreements for Japan. 
                                                 
14  The European Union (EU) was formed when the Maastricht Treaty was signed in February 
1992 and entered into force in November 1993. The North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) is 
defined to encompass the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUFSTA) that came into effect in 
January 1989. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was signed in January 1992 and came into force 
in January 1993. The Common Market of the South (Mercosur) began when the Treaty of Asunción 
was signed in March 1991. 
15 Available  at  http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf. It presents bilateral country 
names, date of signature, and date of entry into force during the period 1959-1999.   14
Eleven members of the EU introduced the euro as a common currency in 1999 and Greece 
adopted the euro in 2001.
16  Financial crises include Mexico in 1994 and East Asia in 1997.   
 
3.3. Estimation Issues 
A concern in estimating a vertical motive of MNE is potential endogeneity of the 
dependent variable and host-country skill endowments.
17 Multinationals play a growing role in 
the global production, and affiliate activity may affect the skill composition of overseas 
employment. Such a concern is particularly relevant for skill-scarce countries in which vertical 
MNEs primarily arise to exploit factor cost differentials. Multinationals may hire highly skilled 
labor in the skill-scarce country possibly because such workers have high labor productivity per 
output. It is likely that MNE activity may shift host-country skill abundance upward and reduce 
the SKILL variable. Such an endogeneity problem would bias the coefficient of SKILL downward 
and make it difficult to identify the vertical motive of MNE in non-experimental data. 
The GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), 
and Blundell and Bond (1998) offer an alternative solution to correct for endogeneity problems in 
panel data. To illustrate, I start by taking the first difference of equation (1) to eliminate 
country-pair fixed effects. Under the assumption that the error term in equation (1) has no serial 
correlation (I test this assumption), I create an instrument matrix of two to four period lagged 
levels of endogenous variables (skill endowments, GDP levels, and trade and investment costs) 
and lagged levels of exogenous variables (all other regressors). The GMM estimator then exploits 
a set of moment conditions that consist of the instrument matrix and the matrix of differenced 
error terms. 
                                                 
16  Among these countries, my sample includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Greece. 
17  I also take into account endogeneity of GDP levels, and perceived trade and investment 
costs in GMM estimation.   15
To improve efficiency, Blundell and Bond (1998) develop a system GMM estimator by 
further assuming that changes in any instrumenting variables are uncorrelated with the 
country-pair fixed effects. Using equation (1), the system GMM estimator creates an additional 
instrument matrix of lagged changes of endogenous variables and current changes of exogenous 
variables. The new instrument matrix and the matrix of the composite error terms of country-pair 
fixed effects and idiosyncratic errors then provide an addition set of moment conditions that can 
be exploited to obtain consistent and efficient estimates of the coefficients. 
I report a two-step estimator that is asymptotically efficient and robust to 
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation within country pairs. Since the 
parameters’ standard errors in the two-step estimator are known to be severely downward biased 
in a finite sample, a small-sample correction for the two-step standard errors developed by 
Windmeijer (2005) is employed. In addition, I conduct specification tests to check the validity of 
instruments used: the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982) and 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation. These statistics test the joint validity of the moment 
conditions and second-order autocorrelation of differenced errors, respectively. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
4.1. Benchmark Results 
The benchmark results for equation (1) are presented in Table 2. Column (1) excludes 
additional controls and column (2) adds in a large number of such controls, with affiliate total 
sales as a dependent variable. Column (3) replaces total sales with sales to local and home 
markets in order to mitigate third-country influences. Since the presence of heteroskedastic errors 
is detected in initial regressions by a Breusch-Pagan test, these specifications are estimated by a 
weighted-least-squares (WLS) estimator with the squared sum of GDP levels as the weight. 
Robust standard errors are reported. Column (4) employs a system GMM estimator for affiliate   16
total sales to resolve potential endogeneity of skill endowments, GDP levels, and trade and 
investment costs. 
There are several notable results in Table 2. First, the coefficient of SKILL is not 
statistically different from zero across specifications.
18  Aggregate Japanese and US affiliate sales 
are not positively associated with relative unskilled-labor abundance in a host country compared 
to a parent nation. This contrasts sharply with previous work on the KC model; differences in 
relative skill endowments between countries have a significantly positive impact on sales by US 
outward and inward affiliates (CMM, 2001), the skill differences have a significantly negative 
effects on US outward affiliate sales (BDH, 2003), and the SKILL variable in BNU (2005) has a 
significantly positive coefficient in an enlarged dataset on affiliate sales. 
[Table 2 around here] 
A major difference in my paper from previous work is that new panel data on Japanese 
MNEs are combined with US data. As shown later, since US multinationals concentrate primarily 
on skill abundant countries, US affiliate sales tend to be discouraged by the relative 
unskilled-labor abundance in a host market compared to the US. On the other hand, since 
Japanese multinationals have relatively large sales in less skilled-labor abundant nations, 
Japanese affiliate sales tend to be encouraged by the relative unskilled-labor abundance in a host 
country compared to Japan. Pooling Japanese and US samples may cancel these opposite effects 
out, possibly leading to the insignificant coefficient estimates.   
The interaction term of SKILL and GDP differences does not enter with significance 
across specifications except for column (3). Although the interaction is intended to capture the 
prediction that vertical MNE activity should be more pronounced in relatively large host markets, 
my sample does not cover relatively skilled-labor-scarce countries that are larger than Japan and 
                                                 
18  I find mixed evidence for a vertical motive in the regressions that replace SKILL with the 
skill difference term that is created from the ILO data and from the Barro-Lee’s data on educational 
attainment of people over age 25. These results are available upon request.     17
the US. It may be difficult to find an interactive effect of skill endowments and relative market 
sizes in my data. 
Consistent with previous literature, the total market size has significantly positive 
coefficients. Column (2) imply that a 1 billion dollar increase in bilateral GDP levels raises 
affiliate total sales by 20 million dollars. Since much of variations in GDP sum are due to 
host-country GDP levels, I also calculate a marginal effect of the host market size on affiliate 
sales, evaluated at the mean of SKILL and GDP difference.
19 The implied marginal effect 
suggests that a 1 billion dollar increase in the host market size raises affiliate total sales by 30 
million dollars. Thus, the results confirm the previous findings that multinational sales are 
strongly encouraged by the market size. 
The square of GDP differences has a significantly negative impact on affiliate sales. 
Column (2) suggests that affiliate sales increase by 11 million dollars as GDP differences 
decrease by 1 billion dollars, when a marginal effect is evaluated at the mean of SKILL and GDP 
differences.
20 Consistent with the finding in CMM (2001), a convergence in the bilateral market 
size increases affiliate sales, holding the total market size constant. The KC model implies that 
horizontal MNEs with high fixed costs replace national firms with lower marginal costs in 
serving countries of similar size.   
Host-country trade costs have significantly positive coefficients in columns (2) and (3). 
The Second column suggests that a one-percentage-point increase in the trade cost index raises 
total affiliate sales by 90 million dollars. The results support horizontal motives of FDI to 
economize on costs of international trade by local production. In sum, the benchmark results 
produce an expected sign pattern for the market-access variables with sensible magnitudes and 
lend considerable support for horizontal, rather than vertical, motives of multinational activity.   
                                                 
19  ∂Rsale / ∂GDP Host = 19.5 + 0.0008*2*GDP Difference + 1.25*Skill = 30.2 at the mean 
values of the independent variables. 
 
20  ∂Rsale / ∂GDP Difference =－0.0008*2*GDP Difference－1.25*Skill =－10.7 at the 
mean values of the independent variables.   18
  Several additional findings are evident. Many of extra control variables enter with 
significance in regressions and an F-test statistic rejects the null of zero slopes at the one percent 
significance level. Omitting these important variables may lead to insignificant coefficients of 
trade costs in column (1). The results in column (3) for affiliate sales excluding exports to a third 
country are reasonably similar to those in column (2) for total sales, even when the same host 
countries are used in unreported regressions. This suggests that country determinants of 
multinational activity approximated by a bilateral relationship are relatively robust to 
third-country influences.   
In column (4), the validity of instruments for suspected endogenous regressors is 
supported by moderate p-values of a Hansen test and a serial correlation test. Although the 
coefficient of SKILL is insignificant in GMM estimation, the larger GMM estimate implies that 
endogeneity problems may bias the WLS estimates of SKILL downward. In contrast, I find that a 
significantly positive coefficient of the GDP-sum variable is robust to potential endogenous bias. 
This confirms a positive market effect on affiliate sales. 
 
5.2. Log Specification 
  The benchmark results support the horizontal part of the KC model by showing a 
strongly positive effect of market size on affiliate sales. Since an estimating equation is fairly 
similar to early work, the results illustrate the importance of Japanese MNE data, extra control 
variables, and a system GMM estimator. However, the regression results may be driven by highly 
skewed data on affiliate sales in which some observations have extremely large values. I explore 
the robustness of the results by specifying equation (1) in a log-linear form to improve the skewed 
data. Note that an interaction term of SKILL and GDP differences must be dropped for perfect 
collinearity. For multicollinearity issues, I use host-country GDP levels in place of GDP sum and 
the square of GDP differences.     19
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 3 present the results in a log specification for the 
corresponding columns of Table 2. A notable finding is that the coefficients of SKILL are 
significantly positive in column (1) but a significantly negative in column (2) that includes extra 
control variables. This suggests that the positive coefficient of SKILL in column (1) may pick up 
positive influences subsumed in the error term and would suffer from omitted variables bias. Such 
a concern is more pronounced by the fact that many of time-varying dummy variables such as 
regional trade agreements enter with significance in column (2). Since SKILL has insignificant 
coefficients in columns (3) and (4), the results show little evidence for a vertical motive of MNE 
activity. 
[Table 3 around here] 
The pattern of sign and statistical significance for the other main and control variables is 
generally consistent with those in the benchmark results. Affiliate sales are larger in larger host 
markets with higher inward trade barriers while they are smaller in higher investment-cost 
countries that are more distant from a parent country. Adjusted R-squares in a log specification 
have declined compared to those in the corresponding specification in Table 2, suggesting that 
equation (1) is a preferred specification. Overall, my sensitivity analysis confirms the benchmark 
results that support market access, rather than factor-cost, motives of FDI. 
 
5.3. Japanese versus US MNEs 
All of my regressions to this point have assumed identical effects of country 
determinants across Japanese and US MNEs that may mask heterogeneity across these 
multinational behaviors. I examine this by estimating a log specification separately for Japanese 
and US samples with common host countries.
21 Regional trade agreements are decomposed into 
NAFTA, EU, AFTA, and Mercosur to relax the assumption that they have the same effect on 
                                                 
21  The Japanese sample includes the US, and the US sample contains Japan. The exclusion of 
these countries from the data does not change the results in a noteworthy way.   20
MNE activity. Note that a land-border dummy is omitted in the US regressions for 
multicollinearity with the NAFTA dummy.   
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 report the WLS estimation for Japanese and US samples 
by using a log of host-country GDP as the weight to alleviate scale effects of market size. 
Columns (3) and (4) show the fixed-effects (FE) estimation for the corresponding samples to 
distinguish the time-series contributions to the WLS results.
22  The WLS estimates for SKILL are 
significantly positive for Japanese MNEs but significantly negative for US MNEs, suggesting that 
Japanese affiliate sales are larger in less skill-abundant countries but US affiliate sales are larger 
in more skill-abundant countries.
23  That Japanese MNEs may have stronger vertical motives than 
do US MNEs is also supported by the FE results that SKILL has a significantly positive 
coefficient only for the Japanese sample. The elasticity of Japanese affiliate sales with respect to 
SKILL lies between 1.1 and 3.3 while it is between -1.2 and 1.1 for US affiliate sales. 
[Table 4 around here] 
The finding that US MNEs are attracted to skill abundant countries is consistent with 
previous work such as Markusen and Maskus (2001, 2002), and BDH (2003). My analysis shows 
that Japanese MNEs primarily seek less-skilled labor overseas and may have stronger vertical 
motives than do US MNEs. This confirms the finding in Eaton and Tamura (1994) that 
host-country education has stronger effects on US outward FDI stock than Japanese outward FDI. 
My study is distinctive in that Japanese MNE activity measured by affiliate sales is lower in skill 
abundant countries. 
The coefficient of market size is larger for Japanese MNEs than it is for US MNEs in 
the WLS estimation, and vice versa in the FE estimation. This implies that Japanese MNEs are 
                                                 
22  Since the number of country pairs relative to periods is small in separate Japanese and US 
data, a system GMM estimator is not employed for a concern about a small samples bias. Endogeneity 
is a less serious concern in comparing the coefficients of key regressors across Japanese and US 
MNEs if the coefficients are biased in the same manner. 
23  The results are robust to the specifications in which alternative measures of SKILL are 
considered, including a ratio of skilled labor to the total labor and Barro-Lee’s educational attainment 
levels in a host country. These results are available upon request.   21
more likely to consolidate offshore production in a large country, and US MNEs tend to respond 
more strongly to the growth of local markets. The KC model predicts that country size should be 
more important for vertical MNEs than it is for horizontal MNEs because vertical firms incur 
larger transport costs in smaller markets by shipping back the greater proportion of final output to 
their home country. In the short run, the host market growth is more important for local sales 
associated with horizontal MNEs than export sales by vertical MNEs. Thus, the results bolster the 
idea that Japanese MNEs may have stronger vertical motives than do US MNEs.     
Host-country trade and investment costs discourage Japanese affiliate sales more 
strongly than US affiliate sales. Trade barriers generally encourage horizontal MNEs but deter 
vertical MNEs that may transport intermediate goods to their foreign affiliates for further 
processing. Investment impediments are more deterrent to vertical than horizontal FDI, as Yeaple 
(2003) finds that business barriers are more detrimental to export sales than local sales for US 
outward affiliate sales. Thus, the results on trade and investment costs also imply that vertical 
motives may be stronger for Japanese than US MNEs.   
  Turning to time-constant country characteristics, affiliate sales are discouraged by the 
greater distance between countries but promoted by a common language and island nations.
24 
Landlocked nations do not affect affiliate sales. Time-varying country characteristics display the 
varying impact on affiliate sales across specifications, and I focus on the FE estimates that are 
less biased in estimating dynamic effects. Japanese MNE activity grew within countries with 
regional trade agreements more rapidly than did US MNE activity. For example, Japanese 
affiliate sales increased in the ASEAN free trade area by (exp(0.48) – 1≈) 61.6 %, compared to 
(exp(0.19) – 1≈) 20.9 % for US affiliate sales.
25  
Bilateral investment agreements increased US affiliate sales but had no effect on 
Japanese affiliate sales. Bilateral tax treaties decreased Japanese affiliate sales but raised US 
                                                 
24  Island nations in the regressions include Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, and 
Singapore, which may explain a larger coefficient for Japanese MNEs. 
25  AFTA in the regressions contains Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.   22
affiliate sales. Tax sparing agreements with Japan entered into force for Turkey in 1994 and 
Mexico in 1996, and Japanese affiliate sales were 0.8 times larger in these countries after tax 
sparing provisions were in place.
26  This estimated effect is small relative to the elasticity found in 
Hines (2001) that lies between 1.4 and 2.4 for cross-sectional data on Japanese outward FDI 
stocks. Lastly, the euro currency is negatively correlated with US affiliate sales while financial 
crises show no significant effect on MNE activity. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  This paper reconsiders market access and factor endowment explanations of MNE 
activity by estimating the knowledge capital model of Markusen (2002) for a new panel dataset 
on Japanese and US MNEs in the period 1989-2002. Similar to previous weak support for a 
vertical motive of FDI, my empirical results provide little evidence that relative skill endowments 
affect affiliate sales in a pooled Japanese and US sample. But the results confirm that market 
access plays a key role in MNE activity. This conclusion is robust to a variety of alternative 
specifications such as the inclusion of a number of control variables, the alternative dependent 
variable of affiliate total sales, and the use of a system GMM estimator. It is also robust to a log 
specification of an estimating equation. 
However, econometric analysis for separate Japanese and US samples present strikingly 
contrasting results for the pattern of Japanese and US affiliate sales. My estimates suggest that a 
1 % increase in host-country unskilled-labor abundance relative to a home country raises 
Japanese affiliate sales by 1.1-3.3 % but may decrease US affiliate sales by 1.2 %. Japanese 
MNEs that have relatively large sales in less skill abundant countries follow the pattern consistent 
with a vertical motive of FDI, whereas the pattern of US MNEs that concentrate in more skill 
abundant countries is consistent with a horizontal motive of FDI. This finding may help in 
                                                 
26  The elasticity of Japanese affiliate sales with respect to tax sparing agreements is 
exp(0.60)-1 ≈ 82.2 %.   23
explaining why relative skill endowments have little effects on affiliate sales in a pooled sample 
and previous literature on the KC model using US MNE data provide mixed support for the 
relative importance of vertical motives. 
  This study also finds that multinational activity is influenced by a variety of policies 
such as regional trade agreements, bilateral investment and tax treaties, and tax sparing 
agreements, with varying impacts on Japanese and US affiliate sales. For instance, bilateral tax 
treaties had negative dynamic effects on Japanese MNEs but increase US affiliate sales. Tax 
sparing agreements raise Japanese affiliate sales by 0.8 % in signatory countries but have no 
effect on US MNEs since the US does not grant tax sparing provisions. All of these results 
indicate that Japanese and US MNEs may pursue different expansion strategies. Future research 
is to explore the particular reasons for this difference between Japanese and US MNE behaviors. 
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Table 1: Variables and Expected Impacts on Affiliate Sales     
Skill   +  Island  nation  - 
Skill × GDP difference  -  Landlocked nation  - 
GDP sum  +  Regional trade agreement  + 
GDP difference squared  -  Bilateral investment treaty  + 
Trade cost  +  Bilateral tax treaty  +/- 
Investment cost  -  Tax sparing agreement  + 
Distance +/-  Euro  currency  +/- 
Common language  +  Financial crisis  +/- 
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Table 2: Benchmark Results for Pooled Sample on Japanese and US Affiliate Sales   
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
  WLS WLS  WLS GMM 
a 
Total Sales  Total Sales  Sales to Host 
and Home  Total Sales
Skill  3968   5742   13439   9077  
  (9516)   (7616)   (9424)   (31059) 
Skill × GDP difference  -0.070    -1.247    -3.359**  -6.448   
  (1.839)   (1.465)   (1.641)   (6.526)  
GDP sum  19.66***  19.46***  14.14***  20.75*** 
  (1.129)   (1.013)   (1.071)   (2.691)  
GDP difference squared  -0.0009*** -0.0008***  -0.0002  -0.0006 
 (0.0002)  (0.0002)    (0.0001)    (0.0006) 
Trade cost  -21.50  93.58** 235.6***  -175.1 
  (44.79)   (42.48)   (63.40)   (174.7)  
Investment cost  -178.6*** -353.2*** -459***  61.78 
  (49.82)   (49.63)   (77.91)   (319.9)  
Distance -1.645***  -1.204***  -1.251***  -1.092** 
  (0.151)   (0.091)   (0.117)   (0.514)  
Common language    8194***  9214***  6729   
   (2323)    (2321)    (13236) 
Land border    67864***  62451***  83015** 
   (7942)    (7583)    (35605) 
Island  nation    1318   -1903   1346  
    (951.6)   (1404)   (6948)  
Landlocked nation    -4287***  -12791***  605.9   
    (1010)   (2477)   (4622)  
Regional trade agreement    1833**  5182***  2237   
 (875)  (1257)    (3743) 
Bilateral investment treaty    -7203***  -4370*  -5878   
 (1273) (2471)    (3727) 
Bilateral tax treaty    -6768***  -5710***  -3882   
    (694.9)   (1057)   (3963)  
Tax sparing agreement    6727***  6089***  12764* 
    (1020)   (1417)   (6603)  
Euro currency    -6743***  -9161***  -4940   
    (1992)   (2362)   (5165)  
Financial  crisis    -2594   -2209   1941  
   (4969)  (3880)  (2682) 
Number of observations  827  827  567  827 
R
2  0.61   0.76   0.72    
Root MSE  14630  11525  12139   
Hansen test (p-value) 
b       0.54   
Serial correlation test (p-value) 
c             0.14   
Notes: Robust standard errors shown in parentheses; two-step standard errors in GMM corrected for a 
small sample bias; the weight in WLS being the squared sum of GDP; intercepts and dummies for 
Japanese MNE and year unreported. 
*** Significant at 1 %; ** significant at 5 %; * significant at 10%. 
a: The number of instruments and country pairs are 50 and 84, respectively. 
b: The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. 
c: The null hypothesis is that the errors in the differenced equation have no second order serial 
correlation   26
Table 3: Log Specification for Pooled Sample on Japanese and US Affiliate Sales 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
  WLS WLS  WLS  GMM 
a 
  Total Sales Total Sales  Sales to Host 
and Home  Total Sales 
Skill 1.291***  -0.752**  0.008    -1.442   
  (0.392)   (0.316)   (0.270)   (2.723)  
GDP Host  0.903***  1.098***  0.762***  0.829** 
  (0.047)   (0.042)   (0.042)   (0.330)  
Trade  cost  -0.249   -0.172   0.363***  -0.105  
  (0.163)   (0.160)   (0.119)   (0.461)  
Investment cost  -0.401*  -0.423*  -0.916***  -0.185   
  (0.213)   (0.219)   (0.177)   (0.679)  
Distance -0.843*** -0.682***  -0.468***  -0.734*** 
  (0.063)   (0.080)   (0.061)   (0.276)  
Common language    0.319**  0.253**  0.036   
   (0.149)    (0.108)    (0.419)   
Land  border    -0.077   0.985***  0.133  
   (0.240)    (0.183)    (0.685)   
Island nation    1.161***  0.687***  1.224*** 
   (0.111)    (0.093)    (0.309)   
Landlocked nation    0.044    -0.729***  -0.242   
   (0.246)    (0.182)    (0.706)   
Regional trade agreement    0.343***  0.361***  0.323   
   (0.107)    (0.083)    (0.267)   
Bilateral investment treaty    -0.614***  -0.239*  -0.517   
   (0.171)    (0.133)    (0.570)   
Bilateral tax treaty    -1.001***  -0.896***  -0.577   
   (0.110)    (0.091)    (0.441)   
Tax sparing agreement    1.923***  0.685***  1.395** 
   (0.164)    (0.139)    (0.630)   
Euro currency    -0.601***  -0.201    -0.325   
   (0.215)    (0.176)    (0.334)   
Financial  crisis    0.672*  0.127   0.069  
   (0.370)    (0.308)    (0.153)   
Number of observations  827  827  567  827 
R
2  0.48   0.66   0.62    
Root  MSE  1.48   1.20   0.78    
Hansen test (p-value) 
b       0.29   
Serial correlation test (p-value) 
c             0.59   
Notes: Robust standard errors shown in parentheses; two-step standard errors in GMM corrected for 
a small sample bias; the weight in WLS being a logarithm of host GDP; intercepts and dummies for 
Japanese MNE and year unreported; all regressors (except dummies) defined in logarithms. 
*** Significant at 1 %; ** significant at 5 %; * significant at 10%. 
a: The number of instruments and country pairs are 42 and 84, respectively.  
b: The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals.   
c: The null hypothesis is that the errors in the differenced equation have no second order serial 
correlation 
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Table 4: Log Specification for Separate Samples on Japanese and US Affiliate Sales 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
  WLS WLS FE  FE 
    Japan US  Japan  US 
Skill 1.057*  -1.198***  3.268***  1.140   
  (0.542)   (0.424)   (1.044)   (1.298)  
GDP host  1.537***  1.063***  0.585  1.952*** 
  (0.094)   (0.056)   (0.456)   (0.211)  
Trade cost  -0.842***  -0.091  -0.148  -0.126** 
  (0.295)   (0.165)   (0.126)   (0.059)  
Investment cost  -0.596    -0.375*  -0.670*  -0.332*** 
  (0.362)   (0.221)   (0.355)   (0.128)  
Distance -0.370***  -0.407***     
 (0.118)    (0.091)       
Common language    0.491***     
   (0.151)       
Island nation  1.132***  0.265*     
 (0.211)    (0.153)       
Landlocked nation  0.467    -0.234       
 (0.415)    (0.209)       
NAFTA 0.483    0.655**  0.316*  0.194*** 
  (0.294)   (0.278)   (0.180)   (0.074)  
EU -0.724***  0.523***  0.229**  0.124** 
  (0.245)   (0.165)   (0.115)   (0.061)  
AFTA 1.809***  1.449***  0.479***  0.189** 
  (0.255)   (0.145)   (0.168)   (0.091)  
Mercosur -0.259    0.287**  -0.108  -0.155** 
  (0.335)   (0.137)   (0.126)   (0.077)  
Bilateral investment treaty  -1.009***  -0.318**  0.198  0.540*** 
  (0.266)   (0.142)   (0.170)   (0.107)  
Bilateral tax treaty  -1.539***  -0.465***  -0.298**  0.142** 
  (0.205)   (0.114)   (0.143)   (0.066)  
Tax sparing agreement  1.562***    0.598***   
 (0.184)      (0.188)     
Euro  currency  -0.338   -0.202   -0.254   -0.170*** 
  (0.351)   (0.219)   (0.166)   (0.045)  
Financial  crisis  -0.388   0.030   -0.160   -0.088  
  (0.523)   (0.234)   (0.095)   (0.115)  
Number of observations  438  384  438  384 
Number of country pairs      41  41 
R
2  0.64   0.73   0.23   0.78  
Root  MSE  1.34   0.70   0.50   0.17  
Notes: Robust standard errors shown in parentheses; the weight in WLS being a logarithm of host 
GDP; intercepts and year dummies unreported; all regressors (except dummies) defined in 
logarithms. 
*** Significant at 1 %; ** significant at 5 %; * significant at 10%.   28
Data Appendix 
 
Table A1: List of countries         
Argentina Egypt  Malaysia  Slovak  Republic 
Australia Finland  Mexico  South  Africa 
Austria Germany  Netherlands  Spain 
Belgium Greece  New  Zealand  Sweden 
Brazil Hong  Kong  Norway  Switzerland 
Canada Hungary  Pakistan  Taiwan 
Chile Ireland  Philippines  Thailand 
China Israel  Poland  Turkey 
Colombia Italy  Portugal  United  Kingdom 
Czech Republic  Japan  Russia  United States 




Table A2: Data sources   
Variable Source 
Affiliate total sales 
Japanese affiliate data from the Research Institute of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (RIETI), Japan;   
U.S. affiliate data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Affiliate sales to home and 
host countries  Same as above 
Skill  Yearbook of Labor Statistics, International Labor Organization 
GDP  World Development Indicator, World Bank 
Trade cost  World Competitiveness Report and World Competitiveness 
Yearbook, World Economic Forum and IMD 
Investment cost  Same as above 
Distance  Raymond Robertson's website 
(http://www.macalester.edu/~robertson/) 
Common language  Same as above 
Land border  CIA’s World Factbook 
Island nation  Same as above 
Landlocked nation  Same as above 
Regional trade agreement  WTO website (http://www.wto.org/index.htm) 
Bilateral Investment treaty  Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999, UN (2002) 
(www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf) 
Bilateral tax treaty  International Bureau of Fiscal documentation; 
Blonigen and Davies (2004) 
Tax sparing agreement  Azémar et al. (2006); OECD (1998) 
Euro currency  EU website (http://europa.eu/index_en.htm) 
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Table A3: Summary statistics       
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Level specification 
Affiliate total sales  827  21364  39071  1.936  242349 
Sales to host and home  567  20782  36177    299.0    223707 
Japanese  affiliate  sales  438  13611   34477   1.936   242349 
US  affiliate  sales  384  30482   42168   676.7   195949 
Skill  827  1.046   0.170   0.501   1.792  
GDP  sum  827  6896   2452   3945   14782 
GDP  difference  827  5856   2496   -5282   9982  
GDP  host  country  827  519.7   1219   20.22   10032 
Trade  cost  827  29.38   13.09   3.70   81.41  
Investment  cost  827  31.51   11.38   12.29   62.97  
Distance  827  8779   3860   733   18373 
Log specification 
Affiliate  total  sales  827  8.557   2.038   0.661   12.398 
Sales to host and home  567  9.090    1.272    5.700    12.318 
Japanese  affiliate  sales  438  7.806   2.189   0.661   12.398 
US  affiliate  sales  384  9.460   1.354   6.517   12.186 
Skill  827  0.032   0.160   -0.692   0.584  
GDP  host  country  827  5.375   1.127   3.007   9.214  
Trade  cost  827  3.272   0.486   1.308   4.399  
Investment  cost  827  3.381   0.379   2.508   4.143  
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